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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. Need for Urban Land Policy Reform
1. Governments around the world pursue urban land policy objectives, and they rely on a
vast range of policy tools and institutions to achieve them. Many cities use master plans, zoning,
subdivision regulations, building codes, and other public policies to shape development. These
regulations are normally adopted to help protect the urban and natural environment, gear
infrastructure investments with development, and maintain and enhance property values. Other
objectives are more difficult to achieve: providing the poor with access to land, controlling land
speculation, and land inflation. In the minds of many policymakers achieving these goals requires
stronger medicine: nationalization of land, public land development, and highly centralized
property registration systems to control and monitor land ownership.
2. A global assessment of these urban policies reveals troubling evidence that many
government urban land policies are ineffective and, perhaps more alarming, frequently result in
significant adverse impacts on social welfare and economic productivity. Since many government
interventions are inefficient and lead to sub-optimal distributions of land resources, some policy
experts argue that the best way to "manage" land use and development patterns is to rely on
market forces. On the other hand, without planning and regulations, land markets are likely to
generate enormous external costs and fail to produce public spaces. In fact, without government
intervention critical public facilities such as parks, open spaces, and major infrastructure and
urban services, which the private sector cannot profitably produce and sell, will not be provided.
Thus, the solution to ineffective and counterproductive urban land policies is not to do away with
government interventions and policy initiatives, but to find the proper balance, or division of
labor, between the public and private sector regarding urban land development and management.
3. These facts raise some fundamental questions: What is the necessary level of urban land-
use regulation to effectively manage urban development in fast-growing third world cities? To
what extent should policymakers rely on economic market mechanisms or use government
policies and programs to determine or control how land is allocated and used? What is the
optimal division of labor between the public and private sectors regarding the provision of urban
services and low-cost housing?
4. The purpose of this paper is to challenge much of the conventional wisdom about the
indisputable desirability of government intervention into urban land markets and to argue for a
reduction in the scope and direction of public policies and actions. It is written for a wide
audience of policymakers concerned with urban development. In preparing the paper we have
concentrated on raising a variety of issues for consideration. However, we do not claim to have
the precise answer about what constitutes an optimal urban land policy. Instead, we have con-
centrated on defining the critical land policy issues and offering what can be only considered a
preliminary set of guidelines for carrying out urban land policy reforms.
B. URBAN LAND POLICY PROBLEMS
5. The crisis in land-use planning and regulations in developing country cities has been
well-documented. Comprehensive approaches, based on the traditional paradigm of
"survey-analysis-evaluation-plan-implement" were evolved from developed country models which
were themselves based on technocratic, time-consuming, and rigid procedures. The most common
forms of physical planning-master plans-have failed for a number of reasons: they are too
static; place too much emphasis on detailed layouts and zoning of supposed future land use; take
too long and cost too much to prepare; don't offer guidance on the phasing or techniques of
implementation; and ignore the costs, financing, or prioritization of proposals and seldom
consider the city's real economic potential. But most importantly, these planning approaches do
not consider actual econornic demands for space-they ignore the capacity of households and
businesses to pay for land and properties.
6. Scores of developing countries have set up parastatal organizations to carry out land
development. Most often they were established to implement three objectives: to 1) channel land
and housing at affordable prices to low- and moderate-income households; 2) ensure that the land
value increases associated with infrastructure provisions were not appropriated by private de-
velopers; and 3) that important but risky projects avoided by the private sector are undertaken.
Implicit in these sensible goals are two important assumptions: the fruits of the land development
agencies actually end up going to low- and moderate-income households and that public land
development agencies are efficient. Despite the great hope placed on public land development,
success has been elusive. In cases where public land development does seem to work, authorities
are locally controlled and managed, targeted on a limited range of objectives, and are well
capitalized.
7. Important roles for scaled-back public land development corporations are to assist
developers in tackling large and complex projects and to provide infrastructure. Instead of having
public agencies attempt to develop areas on their own, a partnership between private land
developers, construction contractors, and governments is needed.
8. Most government interventions into urban land management are far too centralized. Many
nations have national regulations regarding land-use planning. Locally prepared land-use plans
are frequently required to be reviewed by national ministries of planning or local government.
Since this review process takes months, the approved plans are clearly out of date. Such reviews
offer little benefit to the local government, but where they become effective, they ensure that the
central government can maintain control over land management.
9. The lack of good cadastral, registration, and tenure records is a serious constraint on
efficient city growth in developing countries. Formal systems in such countries were often estab-
lished at a time of slow urban growth, but now the increasing volume of land transactions, and
changes in land use related to urbanization, are causing land registration agencies to fall further
and further behind in their work. In addition, the costs of registration and related procedures,
including staff time, transfer taxes, stamp duties, and in some cases unofficial payments, may
breed a cynical attitude in the community about the supposed benefits of using the formal
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process. Further problems arise in the many cities where up to 80 percent of residents occupy
their land and dwellings without any formal security of land tenure, as in most squatter
settlements in Latin America. In Africa, the situation is more complicated since many areas in
cities are still controlled by tribal systems of land tenure. In these circumstances, central and city
governments have little control over planning, land allocation, and administration.
10. In fast-growing cities, infrastructure deployment persistently lags behind demand. The lack
of adequate services imposes tragic health effects on millions of households in terms of
dysentery, hepatitis, and cholera. Even when resources are available for infrastructure investment,
poor coordination may constrain land development. In some cases, the problem may be insuf-
ficient coordination between the infrastructure agencies themselves. In other cases, there may be
more general weaknesses in the plan-making and enforcement mechanisms available at the city
level. These may lead infrastructure agencies to dismiss the planning apparatus as too weak to
act as an effective framework for their investment plans. Other reasons include conflicting
objectives among line agencies and different funding sources for different infrastructure
components.
C. GUIDELINES FOR REFORMING URBAN LAND POLICIES
11. This paper presents a series of guidelines for policy reform, and most of them imply
major political decisions and commitments on the part of governments, especially clear support
for deregulation and privatization. The scope and depth of reform can vary. For example, at a
modest level, land-use regulatory reforms can be initiated and targeted on master plans,
subdivision controls, or permitting systems. A more ambitious reform program would be to
restructure public land development agencies, breaking large authorities into small operations, and
privatizing or liquidating some land development operations.
12. Depending on the focus and extent of reforms, either major or minor modifications will
be required to enable legislation and statutes. Reforms may also necessitate fundamental changes
in systems of property rights as well. Obviously, before strategies for major urban land policy
reform can be developed, political and technical assessments are required.
The First Step to Reform: The Land Market Assessment
13. The essential problem with most nations' urban land-use policies is too much government
regulation and not enough government support of private-sector institutions. The first and obvious
step is for governments to conduct an audit of their urban land policies. As described in another
Urban Management Program paper, a tool known as the Land Market Assessment has been
developed for this purpose.
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The Second Step: Decentralize Land Management Authority
14. It will be far easier to reform urban land policies if responsibilities for them are delegated
to local governments. As a second step, national level assessments of the legal and institutional
arrangements for urban land policy making and implementation should be undertaken. If power
can be devolved to local government, the reform initiatives outlined below can be more
effectively pursued and better structured to fit local land market conditions.
The Third Step: Deregulate
15. A careful and balanced deregulation of urban land policies and regulations can work to
reduce land prices and increase land market efficiency. The first and most effective method for
reducing the price effects of land-use and development controls is to bring land supply into
balance with land demand. Residential subdivision standards should be assessed and revised to
lower land development and construction costs. Land-use and development controls should be
simplified and the approval cycle shortened.
The Fourth Step: Curtail Public Land Development Agencies
16. In many countries, public land development agencies do little to improve land market
operations or to provide land and housing for the poor and quite often they pose a serious finan-
cial drain to governments. It is important for governments to critically assess the performance
of these organizations and take corrective actions. Such actions might include restructuring very
large parastatal organizations, privatizing all or part of these corporations, or liquidating them.
The Fifth Step: Improve Efficiency of Land Market Operations
17. In market-based countries where both customary and/or informal systems of land trading
occur, the government should heavily invest in or promote private initiatives to provide a
common titling and registration system to support land transactions. At a minimum, cadastral,
subdivision, and parcel maps should be compiled, along with a system for recording real property
transactions and updating ownership records. If property tax systems are to be used, additional
mapped and transaction-based records are needed on property values, tax assessments, payments,
and receipts.
The Sixth Step: Provide the Financial, Institutional and Spatial Structure for Installing
Infrastructure Networks
18. Urban land policy needs to be linked with a sustainable program for infrastructure
investment. Such a program requires that a basic spatial structure be prepared for each city,
and that it be used to estimate the capital costs associated with providing the necessary
infrastructure to support development. The financial program must be sustainable, this means
that, to the fullest extent possible, the users and beneficiaries of the system should pay for it.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary i
I. RETHINKING URBAN LAND POLICIES: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1990s 1
A. Objective of the Paper 1
B. Organization of the Paper 2
II. WHY URBAN LAND POLICIES NEED REFORM 3
A. Coping with Massive Urbanization 3
The Importance of Flexibility and Economic Activity 6
B. Economic Importance of Cities 9
Land as the Platform of Economic Activity 10
C. Improving Urban Economic Productivity 10
Land Use Regulations Retard Economic Dynamism 12
Flexibility and Industrial Restructuring 13
Making Land-use Planning "Market Friendly" 14
III. LAND MARKET PROBLEMS: TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT IN THE
WRONG PLACES, NOT ENOUGH GOVERNMENT IN THE RIGHT PLACES 15
A. What Urban Land Policies Should Do 15
B. Too Much Government 16
Irrelevant and COstly Physical Plans and Regulations 16
Most Master Plans Spawn Rigid Regulations 17
The Price Effects of Strict Land-use 21
Escaping form Strict Land-use Controls: The Informal Sector 22
Inappropriate Regulations and Standards 24
Procedural Delays and Red Tape 28
Public Land Development 29
Urban Land Policy is too Centralized 31
C. Not Enough Government 31
Poor titling registration and Tenure Security 31
Limited Infrastructure Capacity 33
Joint Public-private Real Estate Development 34
IV. MAKING THE NECESSARY REFORMS: SOME GUIDLINES 35
A. The First Step to Reform: The Land Market Assessment 35
B. The Second Step: Decentralize Land Management Authority 37
C. The Third Step: Deregulate 37
D. The Fourth Step: Curtail Public Land Development Agencies 38
E. The Fifth Step: Improve Efficiency of Land
Market Operations 40
vi
F. The Sixth Step: Provide the Financial, Institutional, and
Spatial Structure for Installing Infrastructure Networks. 41
V. CONCLUSIONS 42
REFERENCES 44
BOXES
Box 1: Botswana's Reform of Urban Land Policies 6
Box 2: Land-use Planning in Zhejiang Province 8
Box 3: Informal Development in East Delhi 12
Box 4: Karachi Development Authority 30
Box 5: Reforming Housing Development Corporations
in Hungary 40
FIGURES
Figure 2-1. Comparison Between Warsaw and Paris Built-up 7
Figure 2-2. Red Tape Involved in Small Business Registration
in Peru (Partial Listing of Requirements) 13
Figure 3-1. Master Plan Projections: Existing Settlements
and Infrastructure 18
Figure 3-2. Seoul: Land and Building Regulatory Constraints
on the Reduction of Floor space (1988) 20
Figure 5: Variations in Infrastructure Cost and
Plot Value when Plot Frontage Increases 25
Figure 6: Infrastructure Cost and Block Length Variations 26
Figure 7: Variation in Infrastructure Cost When Street
Width Increases 27
TABLES
Table 2-1: Worldwide Urban Population Growth Trends 1975-2025 3
Table 2-2: Annual Urban Land Conversion, Selected Cities 4
Table 2-3: Economic Importance of Urban Areas 11
Table 3-1: Price Trends for Serviced and Unserviced
Residential Plots 1988, 1989, 1990 by Distance from
City Center in Constant 1990 US$/Sq. meter 22
Table 3-2: Summary Characteristics of Private Developer-built
Housing Projects 1986 and 1990 23
1. RETHINKING URBAN LAND POLICIES: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1990s
A. Objective of Paper
1.1 Governments around the world pursue urban land policy objectives, and they rely on
a vast range of policy tools and institutions to achieve them. Many cities use master plans,
zoning, subdivision regulations, building codes, and other public policies to shape development.
These regulations are normally adopted to help protect the urban and natural environment, gear
infrastructure investments with development, and maintain and enhance property values. Other
objectives are more difficult to achieve: providing the poor with access to land, controlling land
speculation, and land inflation. In the minds of many policymakers, achieving these goals requires
stronger medicine: nationalization of land, public land development, and highly centralized
property registration systems to control and monitor land ownership.
1.2 A global assessment' of these urban policies reveals troubling evidence that many
government urban land policies are ineffective and, perhaps more alarming, frequently result in
significant adverse impacts on social welfare and economic productivity. In the course of
adopting these and other well- intentioned regulations, little if any thought is given to their
potential cost-effects. For example, few attempts are made to answer these questions: How will
master plan and zoning designations, if enforced, affect the supply of land for residential
development? Similarly, how will minimum lot size standards affect lot costs? How do
cumbersome and redundant formal and customary land registration systems distort land market
operations and encourage informal and unregulated development? Failure to address these
questions is unfortunate, since there is ample evidence that overly stringent land-use and
development controls and poor titling and registration systems reduce land market efficiency and
push land prices above what would prevail under competitive conditions.
1.3 Because many government interventions are inefficient and lead to suboptimal
distributions of land resources, some policy experts argue that the best way to "manage" land-use
and development patterns is to rely on market forces. On the other hand, without planning and
regulations, land markets are likely to generate enormous external costs and fail to produce public
spaces. In fact, without government intervention critical public facilities such as parks, open
spaces, major infrastructure and urban services, which the private sector cannot profitably
produce and sell, will not be provided. Thus, the solution to ineffective and counterproductive
urban land policies is not to do away with government interventions and policy initiatives, but
to find the proper balance, or division of labor, between the public and private sector regarding
urban land development and management. Striking this balance will not be easy. As Dunkerley
suggested almost a decade ago:
1.4 This is a field in which simple solutions are suspect. Land problems are inherently
complex both in theory and in practice, particularly because of the interdependencies of land use,
the specificity of location advantages, transfer costs, social taboos and inhibitions, and many other
1. The range of policies i  staggering: land nationalization in Tanzania; massive slum eradication i Kenya; slum
regularizations in Pakistan and the Philippines; breaking up large landholdings in India; speculation taxes in Taiwan;
preservation f agricultul areas in the United States; and greenbelt designations in Seoul. In the interest of brevity,
much but not aD of the research on these policies is reviewed in this paper. Readers are urged to consult other Urban
Management Program papers on land issues.
2market imperfections, not the least the opportunities land transactions provide for corruption
(Dunkerley, 1983).
1.5 Unfortunately, there are few success stories to draw on for policy guidance. After a
decade of research, the effectiveness of urban land policies is starting to become clear: In most
cases these policies, while well-intentioned and responsive to citizen concerns, are simply not
effective and are sometimes detrimental--inflicting significant costs on urban residents and
businesses. In city after city, inappropriate land-use controls, housing policies, or infrastructure
limitations profoundly affect urban productivity and welfare. For example, sector work in
Malaysia has estimated that the annual cost of inappropriate land-use and housing development
regulations amounts to 3 percent of GDP (The World Bank, 1989a). In Seoul, stringent land-use
regulations are blamed for rapid and continuing land price inflation (Kim, 1991).
1.6 These facts raise a fundamental question: What is the necessary level of urban land-
use regulation to effectively manage urban development in fast-growing third world cities? To
what extent should policymakers rely on economic market mechanisms or use government
policies and programs to determine or control how land is allocated and used? What is the
optimal division of labor between the public and private sectors regarding the provision of urban
services and low-cost housing?
1.7 The purpose of this paper is to challenge much of the conventional wisdom about the
indisputable desirability of government intervention into urban land markets and to argue for a
reduction in the scope and direction of public policies and actions. It is written for a wide
audience of policymakers concerned with urban development. In preparing the paper we have
concentrated on raising a variety of issues for consideration. However, we do not claim to have
the precise answer about what constitutes an optimal urban land policy. Instead, we have con-
centrated on defining the critical land policy issues and offering what can be only considered as
a preliminary set of guidelines for carrying out urban land policy reforms. More work needs to
be done. Over the next several years, the Urban Management Program will gather and catalog
additional experience in improving urban land policies by closely working with planners and
policymakers in countries interested in making reforms.
B. Organization of Paper
1.8 The paper is divided into five sections. The second section explains why urban land
policy reform is needed. The third assesses current land market problems, arguing that there is
too much government intervention in the wrong places and not enough in the right places. It
outlines the problems of irrelevant land-use planning, overregulation and high standards, red tape,
and inefficient public land development. It also describes where government is needed: land
titling and registration, financing infrastructure, and promoting inner-city redevelopment. The
fourth section of the paper offers suggestions about how to go about reforming urban land policy.
It focuses on assessing urban land market problems; decentralizing land management authority
to local governments; deregulation; privatization; improving land market efficiency; and financing
infrastructure to support urban growth. This section also discusses some of the special problems
associated with land reform in socialist countries. The final section of the paper offers
conclusions about reforming urban land policies.
II. WHY URBAN LAND POLICIES NEED REFORM
2.1 With all of the pressing problems of poverty, homelessness, debt burdens, and trade
deficits, many policymakers dismiss land market problems as issues of secondary importance to
be tackled later. Such a view is shortsighted. Over the next decade most cities in the developing
world will confront major land market problems-shortages, runaway inflation, and
environmental and economic crises resulting from inappropriate land development. These
problems will stem from rapid urbanization and sagging urban economic productivity.
A. Coping with Massive Urbanization
2.2 The inescapable fact underlying any discussion on urban land development and
management in the 1990s is the sheer scale and pace of the developing world's urban
development. The rate of urban growth is the single most important phenomenon transforming
human settlements in developing'countries. As Table 2-1 illustrates, the world's urban population
is expected to increase by nearly 230 percent between 1975 and 2025, from some 1.6 billion to
5.1 billion. By the end of the century, two-thirds of the developing world will reside in urban
areas. More than half of the urban population growth is now the result of natural increase and
not of rural-urban migration, and this growth component will strengthen over time. By the year
2025, eight out of ten urban dwellers in the world will be living in developing countries (United
Nations, 1985).
Table 2-1: Worldwide Urban Population Growth Trends 1975-2025
Region Urban Population Urban Population Increase
(in thousands)
1975 2000 2025 1975-2000 2000-2025
Less
Developed
Countries 808,603 1,959,485 3,915,034 1,150,882 1,955,549
More
Developed
Countries 752,629 992,148 1,192,400 239,519 200,252
Total
Worldwide 1,561,232 2,951,633 5,107,434 1,390,401 2,155,801
Source: United Nations, 1985.
42.3 Urbanization does not take place in thin air, it requires enormous amounts of land.
As a result, cities will mushroom-doubling their built-up urban areas over the next 15-20 years.
Large developing world cities like Mexico City, Jakarta, Sao Paulo, Bangkok, and Bombay are
converting between 3,000 and 5,000 hectares of rural land to urban uses each year. India, in
terms of sheer scale of urbanization, is in a class apart from most other countries:
2.4 In India, the urban population was forecast to grow from 150 million to 220 million
during the 1981-1991 period-by the year 2001, the number of urban residents will have
increased by 160 million, more than double the 1981 total. As urban growth continues some
600,000 hectares of rural land must be transformed to urban use during the last two decades of
the century, or enough space to accommodate twenty new cities the size of Bombay (World
Bank, 1984).
2.5 Such rates of increase in demand for residential, industrial, commercial, and
community land have few precedents in the history of developed countries. Recent experience
in many cities reveals that land to support urban growth is becoming increasingly scarce. Part
of the problem is due to the sheer scale of land development pressure. As Table 2-2 illustrates,
the rate of conversion of rural land to urban land for Asian cities is enormous. In Bangkok, for
Table 2.2. Annual Urban Land Conversion: Selected Cities
City Hectares Date
Ahmadabad 565 1980
Bangalore 1,311 1983-2001
Jakarta 2,300 1974-1984
Karachi 2,400 1979
Bogota 2,325 1971-1985
Mexico City 4,826 1970
Sources: Dowall, 1991a.
example, between 1984 and 1988, urban growth required 3,200 hectares of agricultural land per
year (PADCO and LIF, 1990). In Karachi, over a similar period, 2,400 hectares of land were
needed per year for urban use. Even in small and medium-sized Asian cities such as Bangalore,
land conversion pressures are tremendous-about 1,300 hectares of agricultural land is urbanized
each year (Srinivas, 1989).
2.6 One of the principal objectives of urban land policies is to provide land to the urban
poor. This is most often attempted by the government developirng land and housing projects for
sale to targeted low-income households (City of Juarez, Mexico 1989). But often governments
5impose sweeping policies to break up large concentrations of land ownership. India's Urban Land
Ceiling Act is the most well-known example. In Mexico, the federal government has purchased
and regularized thousands of hectares of irregular land for the poor (Wilk, 1991).
2.7 How a city uses its land resources is extremely important. In many countries, arable
land is limited and urban development of prime farmland threatens self-sufficiency in food
production. In other cases, countries have limited supplies of land for economic development. The
urban and economic development of Singapore and Hong Kong are textbook examples of the
importance of carefully planning future urban land development to maximize economic
productivity. Both Hong Kong and Singapore embarked on ambitious programs of housing
development to improve living conditions and labor productivity and to free-up land for industrial
estates (Castells, Goh, Kwok and Lee, 1988).
2.8 Beyond the "atypical" cases of Hong Kong and Singapore, other nations are starting
to effectively manage their land markets to achieve social, economic, and environmental
objectives. Botswana, Barbados, Honduras, and Nepal provide exemplary models of
well-conceived and targeted government interventions to increase urban land supply to support
population and economic development. Their approaches rely on limited government intervention
and active participation of private land developers. In the case of San Pedro Sula, Honduras, the
city developed new land-use planning and development control policies that are based on careful
assessments of urban land demand and supply patterns (PADCO, 1989). In Botswana, the
government has altered its control over land supply and delivery to increase the responsiveness
of the market to urban growth (see Box 1).
2.9 Obviously, what works in one country may not work in another and, as always, local
context is a critical point of departure for redesigning the focus and structure of national and
local land-use policies. Of fundamental importance is the structure of governmental administrative
power, that is, the degree to which land-use policy is set and managed by central government.
Since many developing countries built their governments on principals of centralized forms of
administration, the institutions of land management and policy reflect a high degree of centralized
control over urban land development, land titling, and registration and land-use controls.
2.10 On the other hand, the land-use policy reforms being explored in this and other papers
prepared by the Urban Management Program call for a highly decentralized and accommodating
style and structure of land management-using tools, policy instruments, and institutions that are
"market friendly" and can easily be adapted to changing conditions. As McAuslan and Farvacque
state:
The orderly development of land markets, the integration of formal and informal land
markets and settlements, the creation of flexible consumer-oriented systems of land
management, the commitment to transparency, probity, equity and value for money
in administrative processes connected with land--cannot be divorced from and indeed
may be seen as a paradigm of the wider issues of governance now on the agenda of
many states and the international aid community; participation and decentralization
in government, transparency, and accountability in administration, an enabling rather
than a controlling function for the public sector generally. Adoption of this
philosophy and approach to governance as a whole will make much easier the
6Box 1 Botswana's Reform of Urban Land Policies
During the 1980s, the supply of serviced land available for housing fell far behind demand, as
urban population growth surged to 12 to 13 percent per year. Between 1987 and 1992, 24,000 residential plots
are projected to meet demand. In 1987, in an effort to resolve acute land shortages, the govemment initiated
a series of reforms to speed land delivery and increase private sector access to land. Specific actions included:
1. Launching of an infill housing program carried out by the Botswana Housing
Corporation (BHC).
2. Creating joint programs between the BHC and the Botswana Development
Corporation to provide 362 hectares of land in Gaborone.
3. Intensified efforts by the government to recruit land development professional and
technical experts.
4. Increasing the role of the private sector in land development.
5. Increasing the density of residential development projects in urban areas.
6. Streamlining regulations for land development, conveyancing, and improving
interagency coordination.
Initial reports indicate that these and other policy initiatives in Botswana have significantly
increased the efficiency of the urban land market, making it far more responsive to demand pressures. A key
ingredient of this successful program is the emphasis placed on coordination between government agencies
and the private sector's expanded role in land development (World Bank, Botswana Housing Sector Study,
1988).
development of a system of urban land management that aims to facilitate the
operation of efficient and equitable land markets and to contain the externalities of
such markets with a flexible, modest and implementable set of regulatory instruments
(McAuslan and Farvacque, 1991).
2.11 Policymakers need to reconsider specific urban land policy reforms within the larger
context of existing political and administrative institutions. Clearly, some of the specific policy
reforms proposed in the paper presume broader changes in property rights and patterns of
governance.
The importance of flexibility and accomodation
2.12 While there are striking differences between countries like Hong Kong and Botswana,
their urban land-use policies are similar in that they are demand-oriented and accommodating.
Their land development plans are based on short-term projections of land demands, attempting
to accommodate future development, not to impede it. This orientation stands in sharp contrast
to other rigidly planned and regulated cities. A few examples will illustrate this point. First
consider Warsaw. As Figure 2-1 shows, the built up areas of Warsaw and Paris cover about the
same area, extending outward to 40 kilometers from the city center, despite the fact that Paris
7Figure 2-1. Comparison Between Warsaw and Paris Built-up Area
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8has four times the population of Warsaw (10.3 versus 2.5 million persons, Bertaud, 1991). Thisis
the result of very high land-use planning standards rigidly applied, which keep densities low.2 In
such cases, the way in which land development takes place will affect the costs of infrastructure
systems such as transportation, water, and sanitation. More compact patterns of development can
help economize on these capital expenditures. Another side-effect of inefficient patterns of land
development is the loss of farmland. This is a critical problem in the People's Republic of China
(see Box 2).
2.13 How cities achieve efficient land-use patterns is the result of a combination of market
mechanisms, public investments, and planning. In market-based economies with limited land-use
and development controls, urban growth increases the price of land. As prices increase, dwellers
and businesses build at higher densities to economize on their use of land. This shift to higher
densities leads to a more economical use of land (Mills, 1974). Governments play an important
role in promoting such efficient patterns of land development by planning for and permitting
higher density development and providing it with the infrastructure it needs. Setting the structure
for future urban development by building key infrastructure is the most effective method for
promoting sound urban development.
Box 2: Land-use Planning in Zhejiang Province
In Zhejiang Province vast areas of agricultural land on the fringes of cities are being converted
to urban uses. In Hangzhou, for example, total residential floorspace more than doubled between 1980 and
1986. The massive xpansion of urban areas is the direct result of population increases triggered by migration,
China's vigorous housing construction programs which have increased the amount of floorspace in the
province by 50 percent since 1980, and the development of new economic activities which require land for
industrial estates (World Bank, 1987).
The rate and extent of land conversion in Zhejiang is largely conditioned by urban planning
policies implemented by cities. Despite the fact that agricultural land is very scarce, urban planning standards
call for a reduction in the density of development in Zhejiang urban areas to a very low 150 persons per
hectare density. This outcome reflects the fact that planning is completely divorced from resource constraints
or the discipline of market pressures. If present land-use policies and norms continue, urbanized land in
Zhejiang Province will increase by 140 percent, from 21,600 hectares in 1985 to 51,800 hectares in the year
2000. On the other hand, if futwue urban development occurred at the typical higher densities found in other
large cities (gross densities of 210 persons per hectare), the land requirements to meet future development
would be slashed to 50 percent of the master plan amount-36,700 hectares. The rigid application of current
master plan policies results in a dramatic reduction in population density in the four principal cities of the
province and considerably more conversion of rural land to urban uses (The World Bank, 1987).
2.14 Another action to promote efficient and economically productive urban development
is for government to redevelop older urban areas that are no longer economically productive. In
2. Other factors account for Warsaw's pattern of low-density development as well: low infrastructure capacities
including sewage treatment capacity and a reliance on septic tanks, highly subsidized transportation, high air
pollution, and low agricultural land values.
9old cities, central areas are usually ready for redevelopment, since the housing stock is frequently
dilapidated and infrastructure systems are worn out. Also the pressures of international competi-
tion compel cities to modernize factories and commercial centers, requiring massive
redevelopment. Such programs have been fully carried out in Taipei, Hong Kong, Seoul,
Singapore, New York, Paris, and London (OECD, 1990). In some instances the projects were
initiated by the central government (Paris' La Defense), in other cases they were locally initiated
(London's Docklands). Certainly not all attempts have been successful. London's
2.15 Dockland's required massive subsidies, is poorly served by transit and is now entering
the property market just when London's office market is flooded with vacant space.
2.16 Not all government attempts at ensuring an adequate supply of land for urbanization
have worked well. For example, Karachi's inadequate housing production is due to the lack of
serviced land and limited finance capital. The most visible manifestation of land constraints are
the numerous informal housing settlements, katchi abadis, surrounding Karachi. Because these
settlements have proliferated at about twice the rate as the formal sector, over the past ten years
the portion of the population living in informal areas has increased from 25 to nearly 50 percent.
Simply put, because the formal sector has failed to meet the housing needs of Karachi's growing
population, it is becoming increasingly irrelevant.
2.17 In developing cities around the world, the demand for land for urban use is large and
growing. According to the United Nations, between 1975 and 2000, the annual average
population increase of urban areas in developing regions is estimated at 56 million-equivalent
to adding about four Mexico Cities to the world each year. At a gross population density of 210
persons per hectare, this translates into about 267,000 hectares per year. In the next century, the
rate of urban population growth is projected to increase to 86 million persons per year, over five
Mexico Cities per year-requiring that 410,000 hectares of land be converted to urban use
annually. Accommodating this growth is critical; cities need a planning and development
framework that ensures orderly spatial development. The imperative is clear, we simply must
reform our land-use policies. Given tremendous population pressures, a new policy environment
is needed for ensuring the efficient and sustainable use of land for urban activities.
B. Economic Importance of Cities
2.18 Cities make important contributions to economic growth, accounting for
approximately 60 percent of the gross national product of developing countries (Ljung and
Farvacque, 1988). They are the principal engines of national economic growth, serving as
incubators for new and emerging enterprises and places where goods, information, labor, and
other services are efficiently exchanged. In short, cities are theaters of economic productivity and
land serves as the stage. If the stage is cramped, too expensive, or lacking adequate infrastructure,
economic activity will be stifled.
2.19 Empirical evidence supports the inexorable link between economic development and
urbanization. Table 2-3 illustrates the important role that cities play in generating national
economic output, showing that in many countries, cities generate a disproportionate share of
economic output. The respective capital cities of the Ivory Coast and Thailand generate over 50
percent of the economic output, but account for less than 15 percent of the national population.
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The reasons for such economic dominance stem from agglomeration economies. These economic
advantages make cities extremely productive since they lower the costs of production and service
provision. Locational factors are important features defining agglomeration economies, since the
proximity between producers and suppliers can reduce the overall costs of production (Peterson,
Kingsley and Telgarsky, 1990b).
Land as the platform for economic activity
2.20 On the other hand, poor spatial patterns can cause diseconomies of agglomeration.
Under such circumstances, traffic congestion, pollution, and land degradation impose external
costs on enterprises and cancel-out the beneficial effects of agglomeration economies. As
Richardson points out, large, megacities cannot operate efficiently if they have only one main
business center; they must transformn themselves from "monocentric" to "multicentric"
metropolitan areas. This transformation is difficult, and most planning controls have not been
successful in redirecting growth. In both Cairo and Jakarta, planning regulations are having little
impact on redirecting urban growth (Richardson, 1988). On the other hand, in cities with
permissive planning controls, new centers can quickly develop, as in the case of Bogota (Dowall
and Treffeisen, 1991). As Box 3 illustrates, when there are few controls, new informal industrial
areas can flourish.
2.21 In extreme cases, externalities operate to constrain economic growth. As urban
diseconomies force up the costs of doing business, firms shift to other locations. In many
developed economies, business activities have decentralized to suburban locations to avoid high
costs. In cases where these decentralization pressures are building land-use planning controls
often work to constrain spatial restructuring and raise land prices.
C. Improving Urban Economic Productivity
2.22 The macroeconomic crisis of the past decade has generated increasing concern about
correcting unsustainable economic distortions in order to improve the long-run prospects for
economic growth. The Report on Structural Adjustment Lending II has identified the need for
policy reform and public investment to raise the level of public and private investment aimed at
increasing economic productivity (The World Bank, 1989b). Inevitably, much attention will turn
to vitalizing urban economies, which account for a large share of the GDP in most countries.
Improving the productivity of urban economies will not be easy; large third world cities are being
overwhelmed by massive population growth pressures which outstrip the capacity of water,
sanitation, and environmental systems (Cohen, 1991).
2.23 Maintaining and increasing urban economic productivity in the 1990s will require a
set of urban land policies which ensure that adequate supplies of serviced land are available for
productive enterprises, as well as residential and social uses. The critical policy objective should
be to concentrate on the provision of infrastructure to support and facilitate economic activities.
This means providing modern infrastructure systems to provide electric, water, and roadway
systems to enable manufacturing facilities to maintain low operating costs.
11
Table 2-3. Economic Importance of Urban Areas
All Urban Areas Years Percent of Shares of National Output
National
Population
Haiti 1976 24 58% National Income
India 1970 20 39% NDP
Kenya 1976 12 30% National Income
Mexico 1970 60 80% Personal Income
Turkey 1981 47 70% GNP
Individual Areas
Abidjan, Ivory Coast 1985 15 70% Economic & Commercial
Transactions
Sao Paulo, Brazil 1970 9 36% NDP
Guayaquil, Ecuador n/a 13 30% GDP
Karachi, Pakistan 1974 6 16% GDP
Lima, Peru 1980 28 43% GDP
Manila, Philippines 1970 12 25% GDP
Bangkok, Thailand 1972 11 37% GDP
Bangkok, Thailand 1985 13 86% GDP in financial sector,
74% GDP in manufacturing
Lagos, Nigeria 1980 5 40% skilled labor force
Source: Peterson, Kingsley, and Telgarsky, 1990b.
2.24 Poor infrastructure conditions have dramatic effects on economic productivity. Recent
research on urban infrastructure in Nigeria has illustrated that unreliable infrastructure services
impose heavy costs on manufacturing enterprises. In Lagos, virtually every firm has its own
electrical generator to cope with persistent blackouts and brownouts. These firms typically invest
between 10 to 35 percent of their capital and operating expenses to compensate for other
unreliable services-water, telecommunications, public transportation for workers. The impact
of such compensating investments falls heavily on small firms, making it more difficult for
entrepreneurs to start-up new firms (Lee and Anas, 1989).
2.25 In centrally planned economies, the provision of housing by the state or by enterprises
adversely affects urban productivity as well. In Poland, for example, housing shortages make
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Box 3: Informal Development in East Delhi
After independence, the Viswas Nager area of East Delhi was transformed from an agricultural
village to one of the largest centers for the production of copper wire and PVC-coated wire in Asia. Three
factors triggered this growth:
1. A bridge was constructed across the Juma River, linking Viswas Nager to markets
in Dehli.
2. The partition of Pakistan and India caused an influx of Punjabi small businessmen
to the area.
3. The creation of a nearby government copper ingot industry.
Viswas Nager's growth was largely unconstrained by government regulations: government
planners did not crack down on building or business activities. Instead of having to follow strict land-use and
zoning categories, merchants and residents laid out small plots on 20-foot modules that could easily be
combined or subdivided to make efficient plots for small factories and houses. Unconstrained by zoning,
businesses could be set up in houses and gradually expanded (from one room to several).
In the face of political pressure and the obvious fact that Viswas Nager developed into a vital
area, the government provided paved roads and provision of 240 volt electrical service. Fueled by upgraded
infrastructure and product demand, Viswas Nager expanded rapidly. Lots were combined to make room for
larger factories, and the absence of planning and subdivision controls made it easy for the entrepreneurs to
incrementally expand (Benjamin, 1991 in Peterson, Kingsley and Telgarsky, 1991).
households reluctant to move to other cities where employment opportunities may be better,
consequently labor mobility in Poland is quite low, and businesses must pay more to attract
workers than would otherwise be the case if a well-functioning housing market existed (Mayo,
Stein, 1988). These additional labor costs hurt the productivity and competitiveness of businesses.
In some instances, enterprises actually provide worker housing. Under such systems, managers
have far less flexibility to adjust labor inputs to match outputs.
Land use regulations retard economic dynamism
2.26 Another worldwide problem affecting the productivity of firns is the extent and
complexity of government regulations. Municipal regulations over plant siting and construction,
business operations and licensing create enormous barriers for firms. As deSoto has vividly
illustrated in his book The Other Path, municipal regulations in Lima, Peru, require that
businesses obtain 11 different permits to establish a manufacturing plant. In total these permits
cost the equivalent of 32 monthly minimum wages and the entire process can take as long as ten
months to complete (see Figure 2-2). Just to set up a small shop requires the equivalent of 15
monthly salaries. Such red tape makes it difficult for small firms to start up operations and
ultimately limits economic growth. As deSoto points out, since the typical street vendor
(operating without a permit) makes about 14 minimum monthly wages, it is no surprise why so
few of them "go-legal" and establish a formally sanctioned enterprise (deSoto, 1989).
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Figure 2-2. Red Tape Involved in Small Business Registration in Peru
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2.27 On a larger scale, some national or municipal governments have directly intervened
in the land market to decentralize large-scale industries. Most of these efforts have not been
effective. Between 1960 and 1980, the government of Brazil spent $14,000,000 to develop the
Northeast of the country by relocating firms from Sao Paulo. At an average expenditure of
$15,000 per job, such a policy is unsustainable and distorting (Hamer, 1985). In Bangkok, where
the government established new sites for industrial parks for firms, few industries relocated, and
households resisted moving as well. In Korea, India, and Venezuela, for example, laws have been
adopted that prohibit new industries from locating within cities. Policies that prevent the birth
of new firms kill the incubator effect of a city's agglomeration economy and directly limit
economic growth (Lee, 1985).
Flexibility and industrial restructuring
2.28 A final productivity issue likely to command the attention of policymakers in the
1990s is the need to redevelop and modernize old urban areas of cities. The advent of advanced
communication, manufacturing, and goods handling technologies is having enormous impacts on
the economic landscapes of cities. With the globalization of finance, business services, and
production, cities around the world are scrambling to make their cores more productive centers
for finance and business services. Up-to-date communications infrastructure, more efficient office
complexes, and bigger airports are some of the key ingredients needed. In Western Europe,
governments have launched large-scale urban redevelopment projects to provide land for
industrial restructuring (OECD, 1990).
2.29 These same trends are going to hit the large cities in developing countries as well.
In developed countries it is common that between 50 and 70 percent of total urban employment
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is in service-sector activities. On the other hand, in many developing countries, only 20 to 30
percent are in such employment categories. As these urban economies transform themselves to
meet the demands of the future, a major overhaul of land use and infrastructure will be needed.
This pattern is clearly underway in the East Asian region as the rapidly industrializing nations
shift away from basic producer goods to more complex goods and services. For example, in Hong
Kong the share of total employment in manufacturing has fallen from 44.6 to 35.8 percent
between 1976 and 1986. At the same time employment in finance, insurance, and personal and
business services has increased from 18.5 to 24.5 percent. In Singapore, the service sector has
increased from 28.2 to 36.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product between 1970 and 1986.
2.30 The transition will be difficult for some cities. In Shanghai, for example, literally 50
percent of the manufacturing sector's plants and equipment was placed in service before 1949.
Despite the decrepit state of its manufacturing infrastructure, industrial activity accounts for about
70 percent of Shanghai's economic output. As it moves toward the year 2000 massive rede-
velopment will be necessary. Much of the housing stock in these centrally planned cities is
deteriorated and needs to be replaced. The industrial base of many Eastern European cities is no
longer viable now that the cobweb of price distortions is being swept away. Obviously the land
development challenges posed by the restructuring of these economies are monumental.
2.31 On the other hand, some governments have successfully launched programs to
redevelop and restructure economic activities. Kingston, Jamaica's inner-city area, had been
steadily declining for over forty years, with businesses and middle-income families moving to
the suburbs. While the area was little more than a burned-out shell of dilapidated buildings,
market studies indicated that there was a demand for low-cost, labor-intensive factories in the
inner urban area. A nonprofit redevelopment organization was established to rebuild the area. In
the first three and one-half years, the agency leased 18,500 square meters of factory space at
market rates. Overall some 1,300 jobs have been created (Urban Institute, 1991).
Making land-use planning "market friendly"
2.32 Initiatives to improve the economic productivity of cities in developing countries pose
a great challenge to policymakers. Urban land policy will play a critical role in facilitating such
programs-targeting where trunk infrastructure should go, assembling land for new business and
residential districts, designing redevelopment projects, and improving housing and working condi-
tions. To be successful, cities need an urban land policy framework that incorporates sustainable
mechanisms for recovering the costs, public-sector infrastructure investments, a public-sector
enabling strategy to support the private-sector land development, and, last but not least, an urban
planning framework for coordinating spatial development so that the land requirements of a
growing economy can be met with the least amount of adverse environmental impacts. The key
feature of this new approach is the great stress placed on market-responsive planning systems,
where urban land-use planning aims to support and encourage new development not stifle it.
2.33 The next section of this paper discusses key land policy problems. It will serve as a
basis for setting an agenda and program for urban land policy reform.
III. LAND MARKET PROBLEMS:
TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT IN THE WRONG PLACES,
NOT ENOUGH GOVERNMENT IN THE RIGHT PLACES
A. What Urban Land Policies Should Do
3.1 At the risk of oversimplifying the complexities of formulating sound urban land
policies, the essential problem is to determine the appropriate division of labor between the public
and private sector. How much government intervention is needed and where? What can and
should the private sector do to facilitate urban land development? Are there ways in which the
public and private sectors can work together? What is the best way to implement and sequence
urban land policy reforms?
3.2 There are three generally accepted justifications for government interventions into
urban land markets:
a. Elimination of market imperfections and failures to increase operating
efficiencies.
b. Removing externalities so that the social costs of land market outcomes
correspond more closely to private costs.
c. Redistribute society's scarce resources so that disadvantaged groups can
share in society's output (Moore, 1978).
3.3 These principles apply to urban land policy in a number of ways. The first two seek
to increase the allocative efficiency of land-market outcomes. The third principle endeavors to
improve the equity of land-market outcomes by targeting land resources to low- and moderate-
income groups.
3.4 Efficiency-enhancing government interventions include increasing the level and
transparency of information about land markets and removing market imperfections, failures, and
externalities. A common governmental action is to increase the clarity of the land market by
installing better titling and registration and more comprehensive land information systems
(Holstein, 1991)3. For example, in cases were there is a poorly functioning land-registration
system, buyers of land are often not sure if they are actually buying from the "real" owner. In
Jakarta, between 1988 and 1990, there were over 50 major disputes over land ownership. In most
cases, two or more individuals claimed to own the same site (Leaf, 1991). The lack of clear proof
of ownership imposed substantial costs on the land market: first, without an accurate ownership
register, prospective buyers must conduct extensive research on property ownership before
deciding to enter into the transaction; second, owners of untitled property are unable to use the
land as collateral for obtaining loans from financial institutions and thus must either forgo credit
or pursue more expensive channels of borrowing. In some cases land disputes are so widespread
that they effectively "shut down" a land market. In Accra, Ghana, there are 16,000 land disputes
3. However, as will be discussed below, the private sector can also be mobilized to improve titling and
registration systems.
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waiting for adjudication (Acquaye, 1989). As a direct consequence, vast tracts of land in the
northern suburbs are frozen.
3.5 Another argument for government intervention into the land supply system is the
frequent failure of private developers to provide essential services because they cannot profitably
produce and sell them. Examples of such goods include parks and open space, roads and
sidewalks, and community facilities such as drainage and water systems. Goods that are not
provided by the private sector are frequently referred to as "public goods," and many
governments have taken a variety of initiatives to fill this gap. In many countries parastatal
organizations such as land development authorities have been created to provide low-cost land
developments and housing. In other cases, governments have adopted regulations compelling the
private sector to provide necessary public goods when they build projects.
3.6 In the case of removing externalities, governments have adopted a variety of planning
controls, building standards, and land development laws that attempt to eliminate external costs
associated with land development. Development controls limit building heights and bulk in order
to ensure that surrounding properties are not adversely affected by new development. Zoning and
planning regulations seek to limit the types of activities permitted on land, so that noisy and
dusty factories do not adversely affect residential neighborhoods. Such laws are also used to
control development intensity so that existing infrastructure is not overtaxed.
3.7 The third urban land policy objective seeks to improve economic equity by allocating
resources to low-income groups. In the absence of government intervention in urban land
markets, low-income households may have difficulty getting access to land for housing. It is quite
common for government to directly allocate land for housing to these low-income groups
(Hyderabad Development Authority, 1987).
3.8 Together, these three justifications for government intervention into the land market
can be used as criteria for designing an urban land policy. Under such criteria, a city's or a
nation's urban land policy would normally call for a variety of specific laws, regulations, and
actions. Quite often, the central government decides to take the lead to solve land management
problems, in spite of the fact that most land policy issues are of local concern. Frequently,
government intervention is misdirected: There is too much regulation and not enough facilitating
and enabling actions to support private land development. In the rush to "patch externalities,"
governments implement a "blizzard" of regulations that smothers formal private-sector initiatives
and overconstrain urban land markets. At the same time, government routinely ignores taking
action to create land titling, registration, and information systems that are so critical for efficient
land market operation. They also neglect infrastructure needs and programs to modernize and
redevelop old urban areas. The remainder of this section describes the most common misdirected
actions.
B. Too Much Government
Irrelevant and costly physical plans and regulations
3.9 The physical planning crisis in developing country cities has been well-documented
(see for example: Kim, 1991, World Bank, 1984, 1987, and 1989). Comprehensive approaches,
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based on the traditional paradigm of "survey-analysis-evaluation-plan-implement," were evolved
from developed country models that were themselves based on technocratic, time-consuming,
rigid procedures4. The most common forms of physical planning-master plans-frequently fail
for a number of reasons: they are too static; place too much emphasis on detailed layouts and
zoning of supposed future land use; take too long and cost too much to prepare; do not offer
guidance on the phasing or techniques of implementation; ignore the costs, financing, or
prioritization of proposals; and seldom consider the city's real economic potential. But most
importantly, these planning approaches do not consider actual economic demands for space. They
ignore how households and businesses alter their consumption of land as prices change.
3.10 A recent assessment of Serpong, in Indonesia, makes an interesting case study of the
limitations of master planning (Bertaud, 1989). This city's master plan allocates only 34 percent
of the total planned area for residential development, and of this amount only about 15 percent
has infrastructure. Thus the actual developable land in Serpong is limited to less than 30 square
kilometers. Most of the land is set aside for agricultural and open space uses, roads, and
nonresidential activities.
3.11 Another problem generated by zoning and master planning is the inherent lack of
reality represented in the plans. While the plans are prescriptions of what should or ought to be,
government officials frequently treat the plan as given, and program infrastructure into areas
where there is limited demand. Figure 3-1 illustrates the lack of correspondance between the
Serpong master plan and the actual pattern of residential development. Some of the areas
designated as residential development have no settlements and many areas with kampungs are
not zoned as residential. Master plans should concentrate on shaping and accommodating, not
suppressing, future urban development. The plans should work to minimize adverse
environmental impacts and encourage efficient land and infrastructure utilization.
Most master plans spawn rigid regulations
3.12 Master plans are translated into zoning ordinances and other controls. Where controls
have been enforced vigorously, land availability for low-income housing shrinks and housing
costs increase. The cost burdens placed on low-income households is rarely considered by the
master planners. Unfortunately, those who are acutely aware of the impacts-community leaders
and officials of implementing agencies-are seldom involved in the master planning process.
Thus, opportunities to prepare plans in accordance with city needs and household affordability
are missed.
4. In developed countries there has been considerable debate over the value and effectiveness of comprehensive
plans. See, for example, Herbert J. Gans, People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions.
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Figure 3-1. Serpong Master Plan
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3.13 Restrictions on the supply of land and the density of residential development greatly
affect land costs. As Ohls, Weisberg, and White have illustrated, if zoning regulations restrict the
supply of land available for development below that which would be normally exchanged in the
market, they operate to increase land prices (1974). The supply of residentially zoned land is
often limited when communities attempt to maintain environmental quality or fiscal position by
designating land for open space or agricultural use, or for more fiscally desirable commercial or
industrial activities. These patterns can be found in developing countries as well, as depicted by
the following examples.
3.14 Renaud has illustrated the significant impacts of land-use controls on land and
housing prices in Seoul (1989). Three government policies have constrained the supply of
developable land in Seoul: strong zoning policies which restrict the conversion of agricultural
land; a greenbelt policy to block the further outward expansion of the city; and land readjustment
methods linked with monopolistic administrative practices to force up land prices (Bertaud,
1991).
3.15 Figure 3-2 provides a first cut at estimating the cumulative effects of these controls
on the potential supply of residential floorspace that can be ultimately constructed. Of the entire
metropolitan area comprising slightly more than 70,000 hectares, only 50 percent is permitted to
be developed. That is, due to greenbelts, recreational, and agricultural zones, fully 50 percent of
the Seoul metropolitan area cannot be developed. Of this area, about 30,000 hectares is contained
in zoning designations permitting residential development.
3.16 Zoning controls specify the location of residential uses. Site planning regulations and
subdivision controls determine the actual way in which land is to be used for residential projects.
These controls pertain to building setbacks, plot and street widths and lengths, and dedication
requirements for public facilities. Applying these standards to the 30,000 hectares of residentially
zoned land yields approximately 17,500 hectares of land for potential residential use. Put another
way, subdivision standards reduce residential development area by 12,500 hectares.
3.17 Another significant land development regulation is the floor area ratio or FAR. The
FAR restricts the density of residential development permitted on a plot. A ratio of 1.0 to 1.0
means that a building of no more than 1,000 square meters can be built on a plot of 1,000. If the
FAR ratio is 1.6 to 1.0, then a building of 1,600 square meters can be built on a plot of 1,000
square meters. In the case of Seoul, the overall FAR for all residential districts in the
metropolitan area is about 1.25 to 1.0, and the 16,800 hectares can support approximately 21,000
hectares of built space.
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Figure 3-2. Seoul: Land and Building Regulatory Constraints on the
Production of Residential Floor Space
Total Usable Floor Space 23% 60.4 m2 Average per household
Residential Floor Space 30%
Residential Plots 24%
Area Zoned Residential 43% 351 people/hectare
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3.18 The final restriction limiting residential development potential pertains to building
codes. In multifamily buildings, a portion of floorspace is dedicated to common areas such as
hallways, fire escapes, and lobbies. As specified by SMG codes these requirements will reduce
the actual floor area for residential units from 21,000 hectares to 16,100 hectares of possible resi-
dential space. These regulatory measures have substantially reduced the supply of land for
housing and have been a contributing factor to the rapid escalation of land prices in Seoul5.
3.19 The precipitous increase in land and housing prices is challenging the stability of the
Roh government. Land prices in metropolitan Seoul increased at an annual rate of 24.2 percent
between 1974 and 1989 (Kim, 1991). According to a recent study by the Korean Research
Institute for Human Settlements, the annual increase in land values in 1988 (Won 88 trillion)
exceeded the annual wage income for all of the country's workers (Clifford, 1989).
The price effects of strict land-use controls
3.20 Planning-induced limitations on land for residential, commercial, or industrial
development can force up land prices, but their ultimate impact depends on the degree to which
development controls limit higher-density building. Price increases will be substantial if it is
difficult to substitute other inputs for land (Ingram, 1982). As land prices increase, housing
densities normally increase as households attempt to economize on their use of more expensive
land. If, however, zoning or building laws limit density, then the land supply constraints will
exert more pressure on land prices. What has happened in Seoul has not occurred in Bogota or
Bangkok.
3.21 Bogota, Colombia, like Seoul, has a greenbelt ordinance, but land prices have not
been increasing as fast as Seoul's-its real land prices have been increasing by four to six
percent per year over the 1980s. This is due in part to the fact that Bogota's building regulations
are liberal and residential building densities have been increasing, particularly in middle- and
upper-income areas. The substitution of capital (taller and more dense buildings) for more
expensive land is clearly apparent in Bogota. Empirical analysis of housing development in
Bogota between 1984 and 1989 results in an estimate of land-capital substitution elasticity of
0.69, indicating that for each 10 percent increase in land prices, the ratio of capital to land
increases by 6.9 percent (Dowall and Treffeisen, 1991).
3.22 A similar, but more dramatic, pattern of rising densities is found in Bangkok (Dowall,
1991d). Faced with rising land prices, low-cost housing producers have shifted from producing
small townhouses to five- and six-story condos. As Table 3-1 illustrates, between 1988 and 1990,
fully-serviced residential plot prices increased by 21 percent per year. To respond to these high
prices, developers have modified their production strategies. As Table 3-2 shows, housing
projects are now much farther from the city center, smaller (6.8 versus 15.3 hectares) and
considerably more dense (56 versus 35 dwelling units per hectare). As long as housing developers
5. Clearly, other factors have influenced land prices as well. Korea's rapid growth of income and wealth has
fueled the demand for land and housing, and there is some evidence that corporations and investors have been
holding prime urban land off the market.
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Table 3-1. Price Trends for Serviced and Unserviced Residential Plots 1988, 1989, 1990 by
Distance from City Center in Constant 1990 US$/Sq. meter
Distance Serviced Plots Annual Unserviced Plots Annual
from city Compound Compoun
Increase d
Increase
Center, 1988 1989 1990 1988-90 1988 1989 1990 1989-90
Km. (percent)
0-5 63.93 67.31 74.81 8.2 * * * *
6-10 32.21 37.20 43.90 16.7 15.71 17.04 20.39 13.9
11-20 14.63 17.47 21.68 21.7 5.42 6.63 9.42 31.9
21-30 9.55 13.08 15.36 26.8 3.12 4.24 5.92 37.7
Over 30 4.08 5.46 7.58 36.3 1.55 2.10 3.34 46.7
Overall 23.35 27.57 34.13 20.9 4.90 5.82 9.19 37.0
* less than 10 cases
Source: Dowall, 1991d.
are able to make these types of adjustments, the effects of rising land prices will not fall too
heavily on households.
Escaping from strict land-use controls: the informal sector
3.23 If master plans and land-use regulations are closely followed and enforced, developers
will not be able to offset rising land prices by increasing density, and housing prices will quickly
rise. Without other options, households are not formed or they will crowd together. What actually
happens in developing countries is that households shift to the more affordable informnal sector,
where by ignoring government rules, densities can be increased and housing costs lowered. For
example, in Karachi in 1988, the average price of a house in a planned housing estate was
$5,045, equivalent to 8.1 times the average annual income of low-income households (Dowall,
1991c). Clearly, without any mortgage finance system, it is practically impossible for low-income
households to acquire or rent housing in the formal sector. Instead, they resort to the informal
and unsanctioned areas for housing where they can obtain shelter and land at far lower costs. In
Karachi's katchi abadis, houses average $1,266-one-fourth of the price in planned areas. Here,
the unsanctioned informal sector provides the flexibility for households to get access to affordable
housing.
3.24 While commercial activities can also locate in higher density office blocks and
business centers, industrial and warehousing activities have less flexibility. In both Bogota and
Bangkok there are signs that industrial activity is shifting to suburban locations or moving
beyond the region to lower-cost rural areas.
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Table 3-2. Summary Characteristics of Private Developer-built
Housing Projects 1986 and 1990
Characteristics 1990 Projects 1990 Projects
Avg. Distance to City Center 20.3 16.7
Avg. Land Area, (meters) 6.8 15.3
Avg. Dwelling Units 380.4 530.2
Avg. Denisty (Units/hectare) 56.0 35.0
Percent with Public Transport 89.8% 81.1%
Avg. Distance to Main Road (meters) 558.0
Percent with MWWA Water 88.1% 67.9%
Percent Using Tubewells 11.9% 38.0%
Percent with Electricity 98.3% 98.1%
Percent with Telephones 74.6% 39.6%
Total Housing Covered by the Surveys 28,183 24,918
Source: Dowall, 1991d.
3.25 In India, urban land-use controls and policies have a dramatic impact on land supply
and price, and the explosive growth of the informal sector. India has had land-use planning
controls since the 1950s. In the 1960s, policies were expanded and urban renewal schemes and
public development authorities were established. In 1976, the Urban Land Ceiling Act was
adopted in an effort to check speculation. As a World Bank report indicated:
past urban land management strategies have not been overwhelmingly successful in meeting the
more important objectives outlined by the 1965 Committee on Urban Land Policy: providing
adequate quantities of urban land at reasonable prices and safeguarding the rights of the
underprivileged (World Bank, 1984).
3.26 Land price inflation has been enormous. In Bombay, real land prices increased by
720 percent between 1966 and 1981 (World Bank, 1984). The Urban Land Ceiling Act has
caused substantial problems-significant reductions in the supply of land for residential
development, creation of a vast black market for real estate, and an overall worsening of housing
affordability in India's major urban areas (Acharya, 1989). One of the most alarming results of
these policies is the rapid growth of the slum population. As of 1983, India's slum population
stood at between 32 and 40 million people, and was growing faster than the overall urban
population.
3.27 The net effect of such inadequacies is that the majority of urban growth in developing
countries is now taking place outside the "official" control systems. Thus, informal residential
and business development increasingly dominate new urban areas, relying on self-help techniques
ranging from the illegal squatting and tapping of urban services by low-income households to the
provision of their own electricity, water, and sewerage supply by high-income developers.
Increasingly, therefore, "traditional" planning activities are restricted to trying to control un-
planned growth and where possible to bring some development coordination and services to these
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settlements. In such areas, the new paradigm of urban expansion is "occupation-building-servic-
ing-planning." This is a situation in which the much debated question of "public participation in
the planning process" does not arise. It is the public that does the planning and the development;
the planner is left out.
Inappropriate regulations and standards
3.28 Gold-plated and expensive subdivision standards are common throughout the
developing world, making land and housing very expensive. Regulations covering land
development standards restrict the intensity of development by requiring large plot sizes or
excessive amounts of land for circulation and open space within subdivisions. Large minimum
lot-size requirements increase the floor price of residential lots. While large-lot zoning reduces
the per hectare price of raw land, the reduction in prices is usually offset by higher land
requirements.
3.29 In Karachi, where the formal minimum size of a KDA-produced plot is 120 square
yards and housing prices average 8.1 times the annual earnings of low-income households,
excessive land subdivision regulations stipulate large residential plots. All of the plots allocated
by the KDA are over 120 square yards. In Malaysia, land-use regulations and standards add
considerably to housing costs. The area per house provided for roads is up to four times greater
in the typical Malaysian subdivision than in comparable North American or Western European
projects. According to accepted international practices, about 25 percent of the land set aside in
the typical subdivision is wasted. The streets are too wide, the set-backs too great, and land is
set aside for redundant community facilities (The World Bank, 1989a).
3.30 A recent World Bank report prepared by Alain and Marie-Agnes Bertaud and Jim
Wright examines the implications of subdivision standards on land use and infrastructure
utilization (1988). Four factors influence subdivision efficiency and plot costs:
a. plot frontage;
b. block length;
c. street width; and
d. infrastructure standards.
3.31 For plot frontage, two competing factors work to determine cost and price. With more
narrow lots, more lots can be subdivided within each block. This reduces the per plot costs of
streets and infrastructure. On the other hand, narrow plots mean that the houses would have
narrow rooms and be less attractive to potential buyers. Thus, prices for very narrow plots are
quite low. Figure 5 illustrates how prices and costs vary according to plot frontage. Based on a
hypothetical but realistic case project, and assuming an average plot size of 35 square meters, the
most profitable frontage width is between 4.0 and 4.25 meters. At this price the developer will
maximize his or her per-plot profit.
3.32 Variations in block length also impact subdivision costs. This is because there are
economies in road space and infrastructure deployment as the overall length of blocks is
increased. This result is shown graphically in Figure 6. Road width will impact the plot costs as
well. Figure 7 illustrates how increasing road widths influence the costs of plots. The increase
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Figure 3-3. Variations in Infrastructure Cost and Plot Value When Plot Frontage Increases
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Figure 3-4. Infrastructure Cost and Block Length Variations
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Figure 3-5. Variation in Infrastructure Cost When Street Width Increases
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is due to two factors: wider roads are more expensive to construct per block; and wider roads
take up more space and make less of a subdivision marketable. In Jakarta, studies of relaxed
subdivision regulations that allow for 100 meter block lengths, narrower access and collector
streets indicate that on-site per square meter land development costs can be reduced by 27
percent (Linares, 1989).
3.33 Changing standards for infrastructure, such as the types of permitted road surface
materials, or the diameter of water pipes, can also influence the costs of plot developments. In
the case of Malaysia, excessive subdivision standards pertaining to plot sizes, setbacks, street
widths, community facilities, and retention ponds limit the amount of a subdivision's land that
can be marketed to between 28 and 47 percent (The World Bank, 1989a). This range is far lower
than found in other countries (60 to 70 percent), making housing costs extremely sensitive to land
costs.
3.34 Besides raising the costs of plot development, land subdivision regulations limit the
ability of developers to respond to rising land costs by altering the design of subdivisions. As
land prices increase, strict plot size or circulation requirements make it difficult to build at higher
densities.
3.35 An example of this is vividly illustrated in Bangkok, where land prices have increased
dramatically over the past three years. As previously illustrated in Table 3-1, the real price of
serviced and unserviced residential plots increased by 21 and 37 percent per year respectively
between 1988 and 1990. In response, Bangkok's developers have dramatically shifted their
production of affordable housing from townhouses to condominium units. These private
developers, like elsewhere, are market-driven-they build housing that is profitable to provide.
When unconstrained by regulations, they will respond with a product that is attractive to the
consumer.
3.36 In many developing country cities, land-use regulations, planning, and building
standards constrain low-income groups' access to land. While these regulations attempt to ensure
citizens' health, safety, and welfare by strictly controlling building and land development
standards, they force the very groups they seek to protect into the completely unregulated
informal sector. There is a need for a better balancing of affordability with environment and
public health protection.
Procedural delays and red tape
3.37 Another way in which government regulations influence land and housing costs is
through regulatory complexity. Complicated procedures for obtaining development permission
make it difficult for developers to quickly respond to changing housing demands and create
barriers for new firms wanting to build and sell housing.
3.38 A comparison of Malaysia's and Thailand's system of development approval is
instructive. A recent appraisal by the World Bank concluded that newly-built housing prices in
Malaysia increased by an annual rate of 18.9 percent between 1972 and 1982, a rate about triple
the overall increase in consumer prices and about four times the increase in housing prices
experienced in Thailand over the same period (The World Bank, 1989a). According to the Bank
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report, the reason for the rise in Malaysia's housing prices is the combination of high
government-imposed housing standards, overly complex and time-consuming housing project
approval procedures, the sluggish response of the housing industry to increases in housing prices,
and the high housing demand. For example, it takes between five and eight years to obtain all
the necessary permits from 15 to 20 government agencies for subdivision approval. By sharp
contrast, in Thailand it takes about five months to secure subdivision approval from five
government agencies.
Public land development
3.39 Scores of developing countries have set up parastatal organizations to carry out land
development. Most often they were established to carry out three objectives: to 1) channel afford-
ably priced land and housing projects to low- and moderate-income households; 2) ensure that
the land-value increases associated with infrastructure provision were not appropriated by private
developers; and 3) that important but risky projects avoided by the private sector are undertaken.
Implicit in these sensible goals are two important assumptions: the fruits of the land development
agencies actually end up going to low- and moderate- income households and the public land
development agencies are efficient. Despite the great hope placed on public land development,
it has mostly been a failure. As a rule, public land development agencies have evolved into very
large and inefficient organizations incapable of reaching a scale of production which would
justify their size (van Meurs, 1986). Even the largest public land development agency in the
world, Indonesia's Perumnas, does not operate at a scale of production to warrant its massive
size. During the 1980s, Perumnas' housing production averaged 17,000 units per year, about 4.25
housing units for its 4,000 employees (Dowall, 1989). In contrast, Indonesia's private-sector land
and housing developers build an average of 30 to 60 housing units per year per employee.
3.40 In countries where public ownership of land is dominant, land market constraints and
severe price distortions are common. Despite its vast land holdings, the Karachi Development
Authority (KDA) has failed to provide serviced plots to those who need them. Between 1974 and
1985, of the 200,800 plots planned by the KDA, only 76,135 were allotted and only 56,000 were
actually provided with services (Dowall, 1991b). Underpricing of allocated plots, lack of funding,
and poor management have conspired to constrain Karachi's residential land market (see Box 4).
3.41 In other countries, public land development agencies have been experiencing
difficulties similar to the KDA. There are also other problems as well. In Morocco and Thailand
where stocks of publicly held land in urban areas has been depleted, public projects have been
stalled due to lack of land. In both Morocco and Thailand, it is difficult for public agencies to
acquire and assemble land. Private landowners do not want the trouble of dealing with
complicated and time-consuming public conveyancing procedures (PADCO, 1987a and 1987b).
In other instances, government agencies have not used market research to identify suitable areas
for housing or industrial estates. Until recently, Perumnas, Indonesia's National Urban
Development Corporation, did no market research before acquiring land. Consequently, they fre-
quently purchased remote sites which turned out to be difficult to market, or they purchased sites
that were too large-taking many years to sell off. In May 1989 Perumnas had nearly 24,000
unsold housing units, most of which were located in areas with little demand for housing.
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3.42 As a broad tool of urban land management, public land development rarely works.
This is because land development is extremely complex and risky. Inspection of successful land
developers reveals that they are small, highly entrepreneurial, pragmatic and staffed by highly-
skilled personnel willing to take risks. Most public agencies don't have these characteristics
(Dowall, 1989).
Box 4: Karachi Development Authority
The K1DA is Karachi's major land developer, charged with the responsibility of developing and
distributing residential plots to residents. Over the past ten years, the agency has had a difficult time financing
the construction of serviced plots, claiming that it lacked sufficient resources to provide necessary
infrastructure.
The fundamental problem is that the KDA has been setting its allotment prices at cost recovery,
and transferring a considerable "development gain" to allottees (estimated in constant 1988 prices to be
$14,300,000 USD in 1980 and $10,500,000 USD in 1985). Since there is no guarantee that the allottees are
of low or moderate income, the transfer of this gain serves little social purpose. In fact, it creates speculative
demand for plots and merely transfers the benefits of development gain from the public sector to private
individuals. The KDA would have been better off to charge full development value prices for the allotments
and use the additional revenues to build low-cost housing or cross-subsidize the sale of plots to accurately
targeted low-income households.
Market pricing could be achieved by disposing of plots by auction. By auctioning off most of
its plots, the financial condition of the KDA would be vastly improved; production of schemes and serviced
plots would accelerate. At the same time, a portion of the additional resources could be used to subsidize the
production of low-income housing, and the administrative burden of allotting plots would be reduced, allowing
the KDA to concentrate on conveying plots to low- and moderate-income groups (Dowall, 1991b).
3.43 In the public sector, on the other hand, most land development agencies are quite
large, frequently running into the thousands. Obviously, these agencies are much more
bureaucratic in structure and style of operation. Professionals working with these operations will
tend to be concerned about following the rules and playing it safe. They are not interested in
taking risks. Ultimately, given the possibility of conflicts arising in the execution of policies and
programs, staff may be drawn to inaction. This pattern of inaction, produced by conflicting goals
or contradictory directives from central and provincial managers, has been well-documented
(Amos, 1984).
3.44 In cases where public land development does seem to work, the agency is locally
controlled and managed and targets its activities on a limited range of objectives (such as the
redevelopment of a small area of Kingston, Jamaica). Successful land development agencies set
limited goals and are well capitalized (Dowall, 1989). This is typically the pattern found for
public development corporations in Western Europe and North America (Dowall, 1987). Land
development agencies in developing countries would be far better off if they concentrated on only
trying to do what the private sector cannot-assemble land for redevelopment projects (Los
Angeles's California Plaza, for example), provide costly infrastructure to suburban areas (the
Korea Land Development Corporation), or construct low-cost rental housing for well-targeted
users (small nonprofit housing cooperatives and NGOs).
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Urban land policy is too centralized
3.45 A final and cross-cutting problem of "too much government" is that most government
interventions into urban land management are far too centralized. Many nations have national
regulations regarding land-use planning. Locally prepared land-use plans are frequently required
to be reviewed by national ministries of planning or local government. Since this review process
takes months (actually years in many instances), the approved plans are clearly out of date. Such
reviews offer little benefit to the local government, but where they become effective they ensure
that the central government can maintain control over land management.
3.46 A clear example of the problems of centralized land management is reflected in the
bottlenecks associated with land titling and registration. Ghana and Peru have operated with
highly centralized procedures for land registration and titling. In most cases, the process is
time-consuming and complex. In Peru, before recent reforms, titling required 207 bureaucratic
steps handled by 48 different government offices, including the Office of the President.
Navigating through these hurdles took about 43 months (deSoto, 1989). In Ghana, securing title
to a plot can take at least one year, usually longer, and involves shuffling papers back and forth
between local and national offices of the Land Commission. The byzantine administrative
structure severely impedes the titling system.
3.47 The national government's role in land management needs to be reconsidered.
National government is better suited to set broad standards for titling and registration, and
policies on environmental impacts related to urban development. Local governments should have
more control over decisions regarding land development, siting of major facilities, and land-use
regulation.
3.48 More discretion should be granted to the private sector, and reforms -should be
encouraged that promote competition in the construction and land development industry
(Peterson, 1990). Private enterprises should be regulated to minimize adverse environmental
impacts associated with land development and where appropriate, they should be required to
provide and/or build public goods such as parks and drainage systems. Additionally, important
linkages between the private and public sector should be made to improve land and housing
development for low-income groups.
C. Not Enough Government
Poor titling registration and tenure security
3.49 The lack of good cadastral, registration and tenure records is a serious constraint on
efficient city growth in developing countries. Formal systems in such countries were often estab-
lished at a time of slow urban growth, but now the increasing volume of land transactions, and
changes in land use related to urbanization, are causing land registration agencies to fall further
and further behind in their work. In addition, the costs of registration and related procedures,
including staff time, transfer taxes, stamp duties and in some cases unofficial payments, may
breed a cynical attitude in the community about the supposed benefits of using the formal
process. Further problems arise in the many cities where up to 80 percent of residents occupy
their land and dwellings without any formal security of land tenure, as in most squatter
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settlements in Latin America. In Africa, the situation is more complicated as many areas in cities
are still controlled by tribal systems of land tenure. In these circumstances, central and city
governments have little control over planning, land allocation and administration. In Accra,
conflicting customary and modem systems of titling and land registration have resulted in the
filing of 16,000 legal claims over disputed properties. The morass of litigation has forced land
development on the fringe of Accra to a standstill [Acquaye, 1989]. In Asia, a further problem
is the long delays in registration which forces many people to deal with their land informally
[McAuslan and Farvacque, 1991].
3.50 Obtaining proper title for projects in Indonesia can take considerable time, depending
on the legal status of the land, its intended use and the desire of the owners to sell it. In West
Java, land transfers take an average of 32.5 months for title issuance [Struyk, Hoffman and
Katsura, 1990]. Beyond the time requirements, complex land titling procedures impose significant
economic costs as well: titling expenses add between 10 and 29 percent to the cost of land
acquisition.
3.51 One of the major impacts of poor titling and land registration systems is the inability
of landowners to gain access to formal credit sources. Formal sector lenders require that borrow-
ers collateralize loans by pledging their property as security. Without an adequate title, this is
impossible. Extensive research has been conducted on the effects of poor title on farmland
productivity. Research on farms in Thailand reveals that owners of titled land have much better
access to credit than their counterparts without clear title [Feder, et al., 1988]. With such access
to credit, these fanming operations are much more productive, and consequently more valuable.
In Thailand, comparable untitled lands were valued at between 43 and 80 percent of titled land
[Feder, et al., 1988].
3.52 Security of tenure, such as that provided by clear title, also confers significant
benefits on urban households: It removes the risk of eviction and also provides dwellers with
access to credit for housing construction and upgrading. In Jakarta, residential plots with clear
title sell at a 45 percent premium over comparable plots without clear title [Dowall and Leaf,
1991]. Studies of Manila reveal that the risk of eviction lowers the value of housing units by 25
percent [Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo, 1988]. Other research on these informal settlements finds
that as security of tenure increases, households invest more resources in upgrading their
residences.
3.53 While in most instances titling and registration is provided by government, it can also
be provided by the private sector or by both the public and private sector as well. In North
America, titling and registration are jointly handled by local government and the private sector
(the former handling the actual registration and the latter guaranteeing the validity of the title).
In Peru, a new system of property registration was initiated in 1990.
3.54 Designed and implemented by the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), the
Property Registry is created to answer three key questions: who is the owner? where is the
property located? and what encumbrances exist on the property? The registration process is
highly decentralized and low cost. Whereas the former public system was centralized and
expensive (it took an average of 48 months to complete and cost 70 minimum daily salaries), the
new system runs out of 11 district offices, and uses a private staff of engineers and inspectors.
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Since commencement of the new system, 30,000 titles have been recorded at an average cost of
1 percent of the previous method [Forsyth, 1990].
Limited infrastructure capacity
3.55 In fast-growing cities, infrastructure deployment persistently lags behind demand
[UNCHS, 1987]. In Karachi, only 50 percent of housing units have water and sanitary
connections, 70 percent have electricity and 38 percent have gas connections [Dowall, 1991c].
The lack of adequate services imposes tragic health effects on millions of households in terms
of dysentery, hepatitis and cholera.
3.56 Infrastructure deficiencies also exact a heavy toll on businesses and industries. In
Nigeria, lack of electrical, water, and transportation services forces enterprises to divert precious
resources to fund the self-provision of infrastructure. [Lee and Anas, 1989]. This self-provision
is extremely inefficient since it is impossible for firms to achieve economies of large-scale
production. In Lagos, up to 35 percent of the costs of new plants goes for on-site infrastructure.
3.57 The most critical constraint thwarting infrastructure investments is the chronic lack
of capital to finance projects. Given the limited financial resources available to local governments
in developing countries, it is of paramount importance to design and implement new methods for
financing infrastructure to support urban land development. Unless cities adopt a system of taxes,
user fees and charges, inadequate infrastructure provision is likely to persist. One method gaining
widespread acceptance is for projects to pay for infrastructure development. Urban land policies
can be implemented to increase funds for development by levying taxes, fees, or user charges.
3.58 Another intervention to improve land market efficiency and promote the financing
of infrastructure systems is to tax or levy fees on vacant land owners. Many countries are or will
soon start taxing vacant land owners. The argument for the tax is to make the cost of withholding
"ripe" land from the market more expensive and to encourage owners to sell or develop their
parcels. The track record of these taxes is mixed. Most taxes are insufficient to modify the
behavior of property owners [Renard, 19911. A more efficient mechanism is to impose special
assessments on all owners of land to finance new infrastructure investments regardless of whether
the land is developed. The assessment will ensure that the costs of infrastructure are recovered
by passing them on to benefiting properties. It may also provide a more powerful incentive to
encourage the development of vacant land.
3.59 Even when resources are available for infrastructure investment, poor coordination
may constrain land development. In some cases the problem may be insufficient coordination
between infrastructure agencies themselves. In other cases there may be more general weakness
in the plan-making and enforcement mechanisms available at the city level which lead
infrastructure agencies to dismiss the planning apparatus as too weak to act as an effective
framework for their investment plans. Other reasons include conflicting objectives among line
agencies and different funding sources for each of the infrastructure components.
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Joint public-private real estate development
3.60 One of the clear roles for scaled-back public land development corporations is to
assist developers in tackling large and complex projects. The risks of large projects can be better
managed through partnerships between private land developers, construction contractors and
government agencies. Teaming up creates mutual benefits for public agencies and developers.
The possible benefits to the public sector include: urban redevelopment of decayed neighborhoods
considered too "risky" by developers to tackle on their own; increased economic activity and
taxes as under-utilized and surplus lands become developed; financial gains from ground lease
income and participation in ongoing cash flow from joint development projects; private
developer-provided public spaces and amenities such as theaters and cultural centers; and,
developer subsidies for new public facilities.
3.61 Land readjustment is one method for structuring joint development projects where
the public sector uses its land acquisition powers to assemble land. It has been very successful
in Korea and Japan [Doebele, 1982]. In the Republic of Korea, 95 percent of residential land in
the Seoul area has been provided through readjustment schemes. In many urban areas, the
configuration of individual plots is inefficient and does not allow for the efficient provision of
roads and urban services. In its simplest form it involves the pooling of land owned by the par-
ticipants of a redevelopment scheme. Upon completion of the planning, replotting and
deployment of urban services, the participants receive back a portion of their land. Not all of the
land is returned to the participants because some of it is used for roads and infrastructure, and
some of it is sold to generate funds to pay for the redevelopment of th^ area. Land readjustment
can be voluntary or it can be compulsory.
3.62 Other variations of land readjustment have been developed including land pooling and
land sharing. These approaches have been promoted to address the problems of slum clearance.
In the case of land sharing the squatters negotiate an agreement to share the site with the owner.
In many central city locations squatter settlements are on very valuable land. Instead of forcing
the squatters off the site, the owner agrees to share it with them. The squatters move on to a
portion of the site (living at higher densities) and the remainder (usually that portion located on
or near a major road) is developed for commercial use. The financial costs of the redevelopment
are the subject of negotiation but it is frequently the case that the owner pays the costs for reloca-
tion, planning and redevelopment.
3.63 Joint development can be an effective mechanism for governments to get the private
sector to implement its urban land development goals without wasting scarce resources. The
government can act as a catalyst to promote desirable development.
IV. MAKING THE NECESSARY REFORMS:
SOME GUIDELINES
4.1 This section outlines a general framework for undertaking urban land policy reforms.
Most of the reconmmendations outlined below imply major political decisions and commitments
on the part of governments, especially clear support for deregulation and privatization. The scope
and depth of reform can vary. For example, at a modest level land-use regulatory reforms can
be initiated and targeted on master plans, subdivision controls or permitting systems. A more
ambitious reform program would be to restructure public land development agencies, breaking
large authorities into small operations, and privatizing or liquidating some land development
operations.
4.2 Depending on the focus and extent of reforms, either major or minor modifications
to enabling legislation and statutes will be required. In some instances reforms may also require
fundamental changes in systems of property rights as well. Obviously, before strategies for major
urban land policy reform can be developed, political and technical assessments are required. In
this section, our intent is to introduce important concepts for structuring reforms; we do not
attempt to provide a precise blueprint for reform.
A. The First Step to Reform: The Land Market Assessment
4.3 As the previous section of this paper described, the essential problem with most
nations' urban land-use policies is too much government regulation and not enough government
support of private-sector institutions. The first and obvious step is for governments to conduct
an audit of their urban land policies. As described in another Urban Management Program paper,
a tool known as the Land Market Assessment has been developed for this purpose [Dowall,
1991a].
The aim of the land market assessment is to provide an accurate and up-to-date data base on
the operation of the urban land market. Information about the operation of the land market in
terms of prices, supply of serviced land, and present and intended projects provides a concrete
foundation for defining appropriate strategies for improving land market performance. LMAs
can be used to support four broad activities: providing information for governmental planning and
decision-making; evaluating government policies and actions; serving as a foundation for
structuring land-based taxation systems; and providing information for private-sector investment
and development decisions.
4.4 The most significant benefit of the LMA is that it helps to improve the quality of land
development planning and policy- making by providing public officials with basic assessments
of the state of the land market. In planning, as in medicine, diagnosis is the first step in
problem-solving. The LMA is a method for assessing the current condition of the land market
that can answer the following questions:
a. Is the supply of urban-serviced land expanding to meet growing population and
employment needs?
b. Which land uses are growing the fastest?
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c. Where is urban land conversion is taking place?
d. Are land prices increasing faster than the overall rate of inflation?
e. Where are land prices the highest and where are land prices increasing the
fastest?
f. How much land is being provided with minimum services needed for future
urban development?
g. Is there enough serviced land to accommodate urban growth for the next five
years?
h. Is the price and affordability of housing and commercial and industrial space
changing-are real occupancy costs greater now than before?
i. Which segments of the population do not have access to housing from the
formal private sector?
4.5 Land market assessments can also be used to provide baseline estimates of future
urban land requirements, help guide land-use planning policies, and infrastructure and investment
decisions. For example, LMAs can be used to estimate the demand for residential plots and
commercial and industrial space requirements associated with projections of population and
employment. Armed with these estimates, the adequacy of the current supply of land for urban
expansion can be gauged and plans developed for expanding the supply of serviced land.
4.6 Governments exert a great influence, both positive and negative, over land market
outcomes, creating substantial increases in land values. In other cases, government actions are
less beneficial with plans and regulations causing unintentional negative land market side-effects.
The Land Market Assessment provides an information base for monitoring land markets so that
the potential effects of new government policies and programs can be evaluated. The LMA can
be used to answer questions such as: Are there specific public policies or actions which are con-
straining the land market? Is infrastructure placement limiting residential development? Are
greenbelts or agricultural land preservation policies limiting development? Are planning standards
and building codes pushing up housing prices?
4.7 As local governments begin to seek out new approaches for financing urban
development, techniques such as special assessment districts and beneficiary charges will come
into currency. In order to develop these fiscal tools, accurate information about land values and
the impacts of infrastructure developments on land values will be needed. The LMA, by
systematically cataloging land-value information, can play a critical role in supporting the
application of these new financial tools. As a first step, the LMA can serve as foundation for
gauging land-price trends. Over time, as data on land prices are tabulated, the government can
gauge the impacts of public investments and use the information to set taxes, fees or user
charges.
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4.8 LMAs can provide a critical role in helping to inform private investment
decision-making. For example, by illustrating the effective demand for low- and moderate-cost
housing, LMAs can help stimulate the production of such units by the private sector. On the
other hand, they can identify when the production of certain urban uses far exceeds effective
demand, thus helping to bring about faster land market corrections. In the long run, with
improved information about the market, the risk associated with development is reduced and
developers may be able to operate with lower rates of profit [Walters, 1983].
4.9 The information provided by LMAs can also help improve the quality of loan
underwriting and private investment decision-making. Overall, more informed lending decisions
can lead to a more efficient use of private capital for land development.
B. The Second Step: Decentralize Land Management Authority
4.10 It will be far easier to reform urban land policies if responsibilities for them are
delegated to local governments. As a first step, national-level assessments of the legal and institu-
tional arrangements for urban land policy-making and implementation should be undertaken (see
McAuslan and Farvacque, 1991 for a review of these issues). If power can be devolved to local
government, the reform initiatives outlined below can be more effectively pursued and structured
to better fit local land market conditions.
C. The Third Step: Deregulate
4.11 There are three critical reforms that can reduce land prices and increase land market
efficiency. The first and most effective method for reducing the price effects of land-use and
development controls is to bring land supply into balance with land demand. The second reform
is to revise and lower standards for residential subdivisions. The third area of reform is to reduce
the complexity and time requirements of land-use and development controls.
4.12 Balancing land supply and demand requires making estimates of a city's future land
requirements. To do this, estimates of the demand for land for various urban uses must be made
for the next five years. Based on these projections, planning policies such as zoning and floor
area ratios should be evaluated and changed to align them with the demands of urban
development [OECD, 1990].
4.13 Obviously, this alignment must be made in concert with broad environmental and
planning objectives. Therefore, in the process of setting new land-use controls, thorough
assessments of sensitive environmental areas should be made. To meet environmental objectives,
prime agricultural, groundwater recharge areas, riverine areas, and sloped areas susceptible to soil
erosion should be limited from development. However, densities and infrastructure systems
should be adjusted to accommodate projected growth in other regions. A careful assessment of
the network of land-use controls in cities and an alignment of land-policy instruments to better
target important policy objectives can go a long way toward improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of land policy by eliminating unnecessary or contradictory regulations.
4.14 This process of aligning land demand and supply should force planners to explicitly
consider the economic as well as social and physical implications of altemative master plans and
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zoning systems. Introducing market discipline into land-use policy formulation is important,
especially in Eastern Europe and China where economic reforms are underway.
4.15 The second area of reform is to reduce planning and subdivision standards. As
described above, most residential subdivision standards are too high. Street widths are too
generous, block lengths too short and plot widths too wide. A cost analysis of these standards
should be made and government should convene a panel of builders, architects, bankers, real
estate brokers and neighborhood associations to draft more affordable standards. Similar
assessments should be made of codes pertaining to industrial and commercial estates as well.
4.16 The final deregulation initiative is to reduce the complexity of land-use regulations.
In many countries, overly complex regulations increase the costs of land development. Delays
and repetitive reviews sometimes mean projects take years to get approval, adding to the costs
of development. In other cases byzantine codes block new developers from competing.
4.17 Many countries, Jordan for example, have convened professional associations and
planners to review their regulatory framework, to prune back unnecessary red tape. These
initiatives have largely been effective and well received by developers, bankers, and planners
[Erbach, 1990].
4.18 Regulatory reforms and the revisions of land development and building standards
should have a major impact on informal settlements. By lowering standards, the formal sector
should be able to shift some of its housing production down market. Also by introducing less
costly standards, informal land developers will be able to legally produce subdivisions. In
particular, if more land is opened for residential development, land supply will increase and
prices will be lowered.
D. The Fourth Step: Curtail Public Land Development Agencies
4.19 In many countries, public land development agencies do little to improve land market
operations or to provide land and housing for the poor. Quite often, they pose a serious financial
drain to govemments. It is important for governments to critically assess the performance of these
organizations and take corrective actions. Such actions might include restructuring very large
parastatal organizations, privatizing all or part of these corporations, or liquidating them.
4.20 If land development agencies are to be restructured, the following design guidelines
should be considered:
a. Reduce the size of public land development agencies by breaking them up into
units producing no more than 1,000 plots or houses per year. To foster
competition, land development agencies should not have more than 20 percent
of the local market for plots or houses. Set up several smaller land development
agencies or autonomous branches to focus on specific geographic areas, target
groups, or types of projects. Give each smaller agency autonomy to achieve
goals and reward the ones that are successful.
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b. Remove the agencies from the direct control of the government. Make them
non-profit enterprises. Design into the firms the capacity to reward professional
staff for high performance and risk-taking.
c. Simplify the mission and goals of restructured land development agencies.
Avoid the temptation of burdening them with too many policy and program
goals. Public land development agencies should have limited and precise
objectives that are easy to understand and evaluate.
d. Be sure to staff public land development agencies with well-trained and
experienced real estate development professionals. In the long term, increase the
supply of land development professionals by training specialists in economics,
housing finance, real estate market research, land planning, architecture,
construction engineering, and management and land development techniques.
5. Revise the operating procedures of the new land development agencies, design
the agencies to be flexible, do not encumber them with too many rules and
regulations. Instead have the head of each agency or branch prepare a yearly
development plan which outlines production goals and describes its strategy for
achieving targets. Institute a review of plans and activities each year and require
agency managers to alter plans to meet goals and increase efficiency [Dowall,
1989].
4.21 In some cases, such as when it is clear that the private land and housing development
industry is capable of producing serviced residential plots, it may be best to privatize the land
development authority by selling off its inventory of land and equipment. While such
privatization is difficult, public authorities are being sold. Box 5 provides an example of
Hungary's privatization of large housing construction firms.
4.22 Getting the government out of the land development business by auctioning off its
land holdings will immediately open up land for urban development and stimulate a variety of
private-sector initiatives. By turning the development process over to the private sector, the
government can focus its efforts on infrastructure provision, improving titling and land
registration systems, and planning the overall spatial structure of cities. In their place, smaller and
better-targeted government agencies or non-profit housing and land development corporations can
be set up to provide low-cost housing.
4.23 As discussed in an earlier section, the public sector can be quite effective in
assembling multiple parcels of land for redevelopment. The Korea Land Development
Corporation played a critical role in assembling land for residential development [Doebele, 1982].
Scaled-back and more focused public land development agencies might consider targeting on the
act of assembling land for subdivisions which are then sold to the private sector for housing and
commercial development.
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Box 5: Reforming Housing Development Corporations in Hungary
While difficult, Hungary offers a clear example of what can be accomplished. The role of the
large state-owned housing development enterprises in Hungary has been dramatically reduced. During 1989
and 1990, several of the very large kombinats discontinued operations. Commercial banks are suspending loans
to unprofitable state-owned enterprises and remaining kombinats are becoming more responsive to market
demands.
Medium-sized firms (those with between 50 and 199 employees) are starting to grow. This is
in spite of the fact that firms are still having difficulties sourcing materials and securing building sites. One
emerging pattern which is helping these firms, though, is the sharp increase in competitive bidding for con-
struction projects. The share of contracts awarded by bid increased to 24 percent in 1988 from 3 percent in
1983. During 1991, Hungary plans on promoting the construction industry's productivity by privatizing firms,
liberalizing rules for the importation of building materials, and by providing assistance to builders and
developers.
Table 4.1 Changes in the Structure of Hungary's Construction
Industry, 1980, 1986 1989
Size of Firm by Percent
Employment Change
1980 1986 1989 1980-89
(percent)
Small (1-49) 4 322 1,082 2,695.0
Medium (50-199) 108 230 333 208.3
Large (200-999) 153 131 98 -35.9
Very Large
(1,000 +) 70 58 48 -31.4
Total 335 741 1,561 366.0%
Source: United Nations, 1981.
E. The Fifth Step: Improve Efficiency of Land Market Operations
4.24 In market-based countries where both customary and/or informal systems of land
trading occur, the government should heavily invest in or promote private initiatives to provide
a common titling and registration system to support land transactions. At a minimum, cadastral,
subdivision and parcel maps should be compiled, along with a system for recording real property
transactions and updating ownership records [McAuslan and Farvacque, 1991]. If property tax
systems are to be used, additional mapped and transaction-based records are needed on property
values, tax assessments, payments and receipts [Holstein, 1991].
4.25 An important aspect of titling and registration reforms is to insure that informal areas
are provided with secure title. As the Peru case illustrates, such a program can be carried out
inexpensively and by the private sector. [Forsyth, 1990].
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F. The Sixth Step: Provide the Financial, Institutional and Spatial Structure for Installing
Infrastructure Networks
4.26 Urban land policy needs to be linked with a sustainable program for infrastructure
investment. Such a program requires that a basic spatial structure be prepared for each city, and
that it be used to estimate the capital costs associated with providing the necessary infrastructure
to support development. The financial program must be sustainable. This means that, to the
fullest extent possible, the users and beneficiaries of the system should pay for it.
4.27 As is normally the case, the master plan has been used by planners to estimate the
capital improvements budget for the city. However, this approach has not worked because the
master plans take too long to prepare and are usually out-of-date when completed; they provide
no advice about the how to implement required infrastructure systems; and they ignore
infrastructure costs. Most importantly, the plans are rarely followed [Petersen, Kingsley and
Telgarsky, 1990a].
4.28 Instead of using detailed master plans, many planners and infrastructure specialists
now recommend the "structure plan". This plan lays out the basic networks and facilities needed
to support future development. Less detailed and specific, it can be prepared quickly and at a
lower cost than the master plan. Structure plans are effective if frequently updated, showing
which new infrastructure projects are needed to accommodate growth.
4.29 Structure plans should form the basis for setting plans for funding infrastructure. A
variety of cost recovery financial mechanisms should be considered, including user and
beneficiary charges, special assessment districts, and pricing systems to recover costs and reduce
congestion.
4.30 The provision of urban services should be expanded to unserviced informal areas as
well. Experience shows that residents in these areas are willing to finance the costs of
infrastructure service provision if the terms are affordable. This will require that governments
take a more flexible posture towards infrastructure standards and costs, perhaps copying the
incremental approaches to infrastructure provision widely used in informal upgrading schemes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Developing countries need to reassess and reform their urban land policies. Many
cities use master plans, zoning, subdivision regulations, building codes and other public policies
to shape development. These regulations are normally adopted to help protect the urban and
natural environment, gear infrastructure investments with development, and maintain and enhance
the property values of neighborhoods.
5.2 In the course of adopting these and other well-intentioned regulations, little thought
is given to their potential cost-effects. For example, few attempts are made to answer such
questions as: How will master plan and zoning designations, if enforced, affect the supply of land
for residential development? Similarly, how will minimum lot-size standards affect lot costs?
Failure to address these questions is unfortunate, since there is ample evidence that land-use and
development controls reduce land market efficiency and push land prices above what would
prevail under competitive conditions.
5.3 These facts, raise a fundamental question: What is the necessary level of urban land-
use regulation to effectively manage urban development in fast-growing third world cities? To
want extent should governments engage in land development? Should policymakers rely on
economic market mechanisms or use government policies and programs to determine or control
how land is allocated and used? What is the optimal division of labor between the public and
private sectors regarding the provision of urban services and low-cost housing?
5.4 This paper has discussed and outlined a variety of guiding principles to answer these
questions. It has illustrated where government programs and policies should be reconsidered and
reformed and it has suggested what new government initiatives are appropriate for improving
urban land market performance.
5.5 A six-step framework for reforming urban land policy has been offered: land market
assessments; decentralization of land management authority; deregulation of inappropriate and
costly land-use controls; privatization of ineffeqtive public land development agencies;
implementing titling, registration and information systems to improve land market efficiency; and
alternative planning and budgeting systems for financing infrastructure.
5.6 Readers interested in gaining additional information about these urban land policy
reforms should consult the following Urban Management Program materials:
Bertaud, Alain, Marie-Agnes Bertaud and James 0. Wright, Jr. 1988. "Efficiency in
Land Use and Infrastructure Design: An Application of the Bertaud Model." INURD
Discussion Paper, Report INU 17. World Bank, Urban Development Division,
Washington, D. C.
Dowall, David E. 1991a. The Land Market Assessment: A New Tool for Urban
Management, UMP No.4. Washington, D.C.: World Bank/UNDP/UNCHS.
Holstein, Lynn. 1991. "Land Information Management in Support of Urban
Development in Developing Countries: Requirements, Issues and Options."
(forthcoming).
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McAuslan, Patrick and Catherine Farvacque. 1991. Improving Urban Land Markets:
Policy Reforms of Institutions and Instruments, UMP No.5, Washington, D.C.: World
Bank/UNDP/UNCHS.
Peterson, George E., G. Thomas Kingsley and Jeffrey P. Telgarsky. 1990a.
Multi-Sectoral Investment Planning. Nairobi: UNCHS.
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